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Consumer Response to Fraudulent Producer Behavior  
in the Agri-food Marketing System 
 
Over the last decade, food fraud scandals, such as the 
adulteration of Chinese milk with melamine, the dis-
covery of horsemeat in many European meat prod-
ucts, and the mislabeling of Italian olive oils, have in-
creased the attention of the media, consumers, and 
governments about the vulnerability of the food sys-
tem to intentional adulteration or misrepresentation 
of product ingredients or products themselves based 
on economic motives (Lotta and Bogue 2015). Food 
fraud is defined as the intentional substitution, addi-
tion, tampering, or misrepresentation of food prod-
ucts for economic gains (Spink and Moyer 2011). 
Food fraud is motivated by economic gain and is ena-
bled by two important features. First, consumers can-
not verify the presence of economically important 
attributes, such as whether a product is “organic,” 
even after having consumed the good, for many of the 
products affected by food fraud. These types of goods 
are called credence goods. Second, the monitoring of 
labeling or certification requirements is costly, so the 
enforcement of product claims is imperfect.  
Olive oil is one of the food categories most vulnerable 
to food fraud (Johnson 2014). The most common 
types of olive oil fraud involve the substitution or 
adulteration of extra virgin olive oil (EVOO) with less 
expensive or lower quality alternatives. To be consid-
ered extra virgin, rather than a lower quality olive oil, 
the product must meet strict criteria, including re-
strictions on the processes used to extract the oil from 
the olive, and the requirements on the chemical com-
position—such as the free fatty acid content—of the 
oil. A number of recent investigations have identified 
fraudulent behavior in widely sold EVOOs. Conduct-
ing one of the largest olive oil fraud investigations on 
186 samples of EVOO sold in California, scientists 
from the University of California, Davis Olive Center  
Market Report  Year 
Ago  4 Wks Ago  5/29/18 
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average          
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .  *  124.37  * 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .  180.95  188.56  * 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .  158.50  149.97  * 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  246.28  218.64  229.34 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  71.31  58.37  66.06 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89.11  67.61  74.44 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .  160.94  148.82  152.25 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  411.65  374.61  381.03 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices          
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.14  4.56  4.92 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.40  3.71  3.76 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .  8.43  9.61  9.55 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5.75  5.94    5.89 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2.89  2.78  2.92 
Feed          
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .  136.25  *  * 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70.00  100.00  * 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  65.00  100.00  100.00 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  103.50  170.00  155.00 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40.00  53.50  47.50 
 ⃰ No Market          
found that 73 percent of the samples produced by the top 
five imported EVOO brands in the United States were ei-
ther mislabeled or adulterated. Moreover, about 11 percent 
of top-selling Italian EVOO brands failed to meet the crite-
ria that define EVOO (Frankel et al. 2011). A recent food 
fraud investigation launched by Interpol and Europol dur-
ing the period of November 2015 to February 2016, seized 
seven thousand tons of olive oil fraudulently labeled as ex-
tra-virgin from Italy (Europol 2016).  
The spate of food fraud scandals over the last decade and 
the potentially devastating consequences for consumers 
and industry raise important questions about the impact of 
food fraud incidents on consumer behavior. Evidence on 
consumer response to food fraud is just developing, mir-
roring an increase in monitoring and media attention to 
food fraud. Scientists confirmed there were 60 percent as 
many incidents of food adulteration in two years (2011 and 
2012) as had been identified in the 30 years between 1980 
and 2010, while media coverage of incidents increased by 
nearly 80 percent (Johnson 2014).  
To address the gap in evidence, researchers in the Depart-
ment of Agricultural Economics at the University of Ne-
braska-Lincoln examined how information about food 
fraud incidents affects consumers’ valuation of products. 
Specifically, the study examined (1) changes in consumers’ 
valuation of EVOO after they received information about 
food fraud, (2) how information about food fraud attribut-
able to one country affects valuation for products from oth-
er countries, and (3) how information about food fraud 
affects the valuation of olive oils in different price segments. 
To examine the effect of food fraud on consumer valuation, 
the researchers developed a laboratory experiment based 
on the demand-revealing Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
mechanism (BDM). In the BDM mechanism, participants 
are presented with a good and asked to submit a bid (that 
is, their valuation) for it. Then, an “experiment” price is 
randomly drawn from a distribution of prices. If the partic-
ipant’s bid is higher than the randomly drawn 
“experiment” price, the participant purchases the good but 
pays the “experiment” price. This separation of the partici-
pant’s value from the price that they pay means that the 
participant has no incentive to underbid for the item. Re-
searchers use this approach to collect information about 
participants’ true valuations for items.  
In this study, 107 olive oil consumers participated in the 
laboratory experiment. All experiment sessions were con-
ducted at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln between Sep-
tember and November 2017. The experimental design con-
sisted of two valuation stages. In the first stage, participants 
submitted their valuation for extra virgin olive oils from 
Italy, Greece, and the U.S. (California). Participants evalu-
ated two 500 milliliter (ml) bottles from each country, one 
of which is sold at retail in a daily-use price range ($5-10),  
and one of which is sold at a premium range ($24-29) 
(see Table 1).  
 
 
After submitting their valuation for the six bottles of 
EVOO, research participants responded to a short sur-
vey on demographic variables, which included one 
question about whether participants were aware of the 
occurrence of food fraud. Next, participants in the ex-
periment read a text about Italian olive oil. The text 
included general information about the Italian olive oil 
industry, but also discussed real-world studies on cases 
of mislabeling or adulteration of Italian EVOO, includ-
ing those mentioned above. We included Greek and 
California EVOO brands to examine how participants 
responded to producers of the same product who were 
not implicated in the text . If consumers reduce their 
valuation of Greek and California EVOO in response to 
information about Italian scandals, it suggests that the 
actions of one producer (or country, in this case) may 
create negative externalities for other producers. 
In the second valuation stage, participants were again 
asked to submit bids for the same set of six EVOO bot-
tles. This was followed by surveys regarding olive oil 
knowledge and olive oil market experience.  
The analyses of the laboratory experiment data show 
that information about food fraud in one country nega-
tively affects the valuation of EVOO from that country 
but also from other countries. While participants re-
duce their valuation of Italian EVOO the most after 
receiving information about mislabeling and adultera-
tion—by 51 percent—reductions in the valuation of 
Greek and California olive oils are non-negligible. Spe-
cifically, participants decrease their valuation of Greek 
and Californian EVOO by 13 percent and 9 percent, 
respectively, suggesting that consumers’ reaction to 
information about food fraud in one country negatively 
spills over to perceptions of other countries’ industries 
(see Table 2) . The results of this study also show that 
after receiving information about Italian olive oil fraud 
consumers decrease their valuation for high-priced 
EVOO more than that for low-priced  
 
Olive Oil 
Country 
of Origin 
Bottle 
Size 
Shelf Price 
Range 
Low-priced 
EVOO 
Greece, Italy & 
United States 500 ml $5-10 
High-priced 
EVOO 
Greece, Italy & 
United States 500 ml $24-29 
Table 1: Descriptive information of olive oil used in 
the experiment 
Source: Laboratory experiment 
EVOO, irrespective of the country of origin, which indi-
cates that the damage from food fraud may affect high and 
low-priced EVOO producers differently.  
The results of this study can help supply chain managers 
and policymakers understand and develop appropriate stra-
tegic responses to food fraud by providing evidence of con-
sumer reactions to information about food fraud. Moreo-
ver, the findings from this study indicate that food fraud 
incidents are not limited to the product in question and 
may even affect consumers’ perceptions of the accuracy of 
labeling across nations. This highlights the importance of 
collaborative, international efforts to prevent or address 
food fraud incidents in the agri-food marketing system.  
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Country 
Stage 1 Valuation: 
before Info  
Stage 2 Valuation: 
after Info 
Decrease in 
Valuation 
Percent Decrease 
in Valuation 
Italy $13.03 $6.33 $6.70 51 
Greece $12.23 $10.63 $1.60 13 
United States $11.65 $10.61 $1.04 9 
 Table 2: Valuation of EVOO from Italy, Greece, and California before and after  
information about food fraud.  
